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BAD DEBT DEDUCTIONS FOR CAPITAL LOST THROUGH
BREACH OF CONTRACT*
By allowing deduction for bad debts, section 166 of the Internal Revenue
Code compensates creditors for taxes paid on lost capital. Encompassing losses
from debts which become worthless during the taxable year,' the section effects
a return of the tax presumably levied when the capital was earned. 2 Accord-
*United States v. Kyle, 242 F.2d 825 (4th Cir. 1957).
1. INT. RV. CODE OF 1954, § 166 (a) (1). Alternatively, a deduction may be taken for
a reasonable addition to a reserve for bad debts. Id. § 166(c). See, generally, 5 MERTENS,
FEDERAL INcomE TAXATION § 30 (1956) (hereinafter cited as MERTENS) ; Propp, What
To Do About Bad Debts, N.Y.U. 13TH INsT. ON Fao. TAx. 109 (1955) ; Grundwerg, Non-
business Bad Debts-Is the Taxpayer Getting the Business?, 8 MIAMI L.Q. 593 (1954) ;
Justis, Is It a Debt? Is It a Bad Debt? Is It a Business Bad Debt?, N.Y.U. 10TH INST.
oN FED. TAx. 183 (1952); Danzig, Bad Debts and What the Individual Can Do About
Them, N.Y.U. 9TrH INsT. ON FED. TAx. 393 (1951); Guterman, Some Problems in the
Deduction for Bad Debts, 63 HARv. L. REV. 832 (1950) ; Hanigsberg, Distinguishing a
Fully Deductible Loss From a Non-Business Bad Debt, N.Y.U. 7TH INST. ON FED. TAX.
914 (1949) ; Tye, Pointers in Bad Debts, Worthless Securities and Other Business Losses,
N.Y.U. 6TH INsT. ON FED. TAx. 681 (1948) ; Green, Outline of Points To Be Considered
in Bad Debt and Worthless Security Write-offs, N.Y.U. 5TH INsT. ON FED. TAX. 646
(1947).
The prerequisites of deductibility are: a valid and enforceable debt, George J. Schaefer,
24 T.C. 638 (1955), rev'd on other grounds, 240 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1957), owed to the
taxpayer, Kentucky Rock Asphalt Co. v. Helburn, 108 F.2d 779 (6th Cir. 1940), which
had value when acquired, Miriam C. Pierson, 27 T.C. 330 (1956) ; Eckert V. Burnet, 283
U.S. 140 (1931), is determined to be worthless within the taxable year, Lockwood Myrick,
P-H 1956 T.C. Mem. Dec. ff 56010, and in which the taxpayer has a basis, 5 MERTENS
§ 30.12; see note 3 infra. See also Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.166-7(a), (c) (1956).
A debt has been defined as "that which is due from one person to another, whether money,
goods or services; that which one person is bound to pay to another, or to perform for his
benefit .... [that which is an] unconditional obligation to pay." Gilman v. Commissioner,
53 F.2d 47, 50 (8th Cir. 1931), quoted in David E. Thompson, P-H 1944 T.C. Mem. Dec.
1 44175. It has also been defined as "every claim and demand upon which a judgment for
a sum of money, or directing the payment of money, could be recovered in an action."
Ambrose D. Henry, 8 B.T.A. 1089, 1097 (1927). The basic test is the existence of an
unconditional obligation to pay, Thompson v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1956) ;
5 MERTENS § 30.03, or of a debtor-creditor relationship, Henry v. Burnet, 48 F.2d 459
(D.C. Cir. 1931); Birdsboro Steel Foundry & Mach. Co. v. United States, 78 Ct. Cl.
100, 3 F. Supp. 640 (1933). See also Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.166-1(f) (1956).
Accordingly, the historical distinction between actions of indebitatus and special assumpsit,
see 5 CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs § 995 (1951) (hereinafter cited as CoahIN), is not relevant in
this area of tax law, since debts arising from either may satisfy the criteria of deductibility.
But see 3 RIA, FED. TAX COornNAroR § M-2501, at nn.3-6 and accompanying text, at-
tempting to distinguish a debt from breach of contract and relying on Lewellyn v. Electric
Reduction Co., 275 U.S. 243 (1927), shown inapposite, note 16 infra.
2. A deduction from current income may not return the exact tax previously paid
since the income tax assessment, measured by a percentage of taxable income, varies with
the taxpayer's "bracket" in a given year. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1, 3. If a tax-
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ingly, a debt is deductible only to the extent the taxpayer fails to realize a
return of capital. 3 Full deductibility from ordinary income, however, is denied
even that portion of a nonbusiness bad debt which represents unreturned capi-
tal.4 Since many nonbusiness loans are in fact gifts, the Code, in a blanket
attempt to increase revenue and avoid inordinate problems of detection and
enforcement, treats nonbusiness bad debts as deductible short-term capital
losses.5 Nonbusiness capital losses reflecting either depreciation or market
payer's adjusted gross income at the time the capital was earned were less than the deduc-
tions to which he was entitled, a subsequent bad debt deduction would yield a net tax gain,
for the taxpayer would not have paid a tax on the income when received. Cf., e.g., Maurice
P. O'Meara, 8 T.C. 622 (1947). Similarly, exempt income or gift or bequest may be the
source of the taxpayer's capital. See, generally, 1 MERTENS § 5.06, at n.48. In the former
instance, however, a bad debt deduction may represent compensation for a lost tax advan-
tage. To the extent inclusion of the income subsequently lost offsets a deduction which
could have been utilized in another taxable year, the taxpayer suffered a disadvantage. Cf.,
e.g., Note, 65 YALE L.J. 1045 (1956). However, since the year in which money subse-
quently lost in a bad debt was earned is impossible to determine, a deduction from cur-
rent income is the only feasible method of compensating the average taxpayer for his pre-
vious tax payment.
The bad debt deduction may not have originally been rationalized in economic terms.
It may have derived from a nonrational, sympathetic reaction favoring disappointed cred-
itors and encouraging the extension of credit or a desire to accord bad debts a treatment
comparable to that given other investment losses. Cf. note 6 infra. Theoretically, a bad
debt deduction, based upon economic considerations, should be geared to the length of time
the taxpayer had the beneficial use of the lost capital. Obviously, this theory is impossible
to effectuate since taxpayers as a rule do not segregate annual income.
3. "[T]he basis for determining the amount of the deduction for any bad debt shall
be the adjusted basis provided in section 1011 for determining the loss from the sale or
other disposition of property." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 166(b). The adjusted cost basis
represents the after-tax income invested by the taxpayer in the particular capital asset.
See id. §§ 1011, 1012, 1016.
A bad debt deduction will not be allowed for failure to receive funds which have never
been reported as income. Henry V. Poor, 11 B.T.A. 781 (1928), aff'd per curiain, 30 F.2d
1019 (2d Cir. 1929) ; John L. Seymour, 14 T.C. 1111 (1950) (bonus stock) ; Maurice P.
O'Meara, supra note 2, at 633 (royalties) ; Charles A. Collin, 1 B.T.A. 305 (1925) (in-
terest); Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.166-2 (1956) (uncollectible obligations to pay
income items such as wages and salaries, rents and interest). Similarly, deduction has
been denied for failure to receive funds which were not taxable income where taxpayer
had no basis which would establish a loss. W. Thomas Menefee, 8 T.C. 309 (1947)
(alimony) ; Pearl A. Long, 35 B.T.A. 479 (1937), aff'd on other grounds, 96 F.2d 270
(9th Cir. 1938) (same).
4. Business bad debts, on the other hand, are fully deductible from income, INT. RaV.
CODE OF 1954, § 166(a) (1), to the extent that they are worthless, id. § 166(a) (2). Unused
deductions may be applied as net operating carrybacks and carryovers without the limita-
tions applicable to capital losses. Compare id. § 172 (net operating loss carryover), with
id. § 1212 (capital loss carryover). All bad debts owed a corporation are business bad
debts. Id. § 166(d) (1).
5. IN r. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 166(d) (1) (B). Consequently, nonbusiness bad debts are
deductible from capital gains and taxable income up to $1,000 under § 1211(b). A five-
year carryover provision applies. Id. § 1212. Partial deduction of nonbusiness bad debts
is not permitted. Id. § 166(d) (1) (A) ; Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.166-7(a) (1956).
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fluctuations, on the other hand, are not granted a deduction.6 Often, bad debts
manifest characteristics typical of such nondeductible losses.7 In this event,
attention focused on irrelevant aspects of a transaction may give rise to in-
equitable tax treatment.
In the recent case of United States v. Kyle, for example, an uncollectible
judgment for breach of contract was treated as a nondeductible capital loss.8
This reduced tax benefit diminishes incentive to defraud the government, increases total
revenue and permits the Commissioner to forego litigation without significant revenue
loss. Note, 65 YALE LJ. 247 n.4 (1955). For the legislative background and success of
the 1942 act, Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23(k) (4), added by 56 STAT. 821 (1942) (now
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 166(d)), which first distinguished between business and non-
business bad debts, see Note, 65 YALE L.J. 247 n.4 (1955). See, generally, Guterman, supra
note 1.
In Putnam v. Commissioner, 352 U.S. 82 (1956), the Supreme Court divided on the
purpose of the business-nonbusiness bad debt distinction. The majority argued a dual
policy: maximization of revenue to finance World War II with a correlative minimization
of fraudulent deductions for gifts disguised as loans, and an attempt to "put nonbusiness
investments in the form of loans on a footing with other nonbusiness investments." Id. at
90-92. The dissent contended that the congressional objective was solely to reduce revenue
losses on gifts deducted as bad debts. Id. at 98-99.
However, the distinction impedes full deduction of losses on nonbusiness transactions
entered into for profit which happen to involve default on an obligation. See Note, 65 YALE
LJ. 247 (1955) (criticizing this result). For the differences between bad debts and losses
generally, see 5 MERTENs § 30.14.
An alternative means of preventing fraudulent deduction of gifts disguised as loans
would be a provision patterned after INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 267, which prevents
deductions for losses on intrafamily transactions. Since the § 166 business-nonbusiness
distinction was aimed primarily at loans between related taxpayers, see H.R. REP. No.
2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1942), such a provision would implement the original in-
tent. Furthermore, the problem of proof facing the Commissioner, which the 1942 act
sought to relieve, could be met by stringent enforcement of the requirement that a taxpayer
show the existence of a valid and enforceable legal obligation which had value when
acquired and which later became worthless. See 5 MEaTxxs §§ 30.03, 30.11, 30.28; note 1
supra.
6. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 165(c), allows individuals to deduct only those losses
incurred in a trade or business, in a transaction entered into for profit or through casualty
or theft. For purposes of deductibility, bad debts and capital losses are mutually exclusive
categories. Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 182 (1934); 5 MERTmNs
§ 30.14. Furthermore, the statute of limitations for claims of credit or refund is seven
years for bad debts and only three years for ordinary losses. Compare INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 651.1 (d) (1), with id. § 6511(a).
Section 262 provides that, absent specific exceptions, "no deduction shall be allowed for
personal, living, or family expenses." Generally, a decrease in value of nonbusiness prop-
erty reflects depreciation from use. Thus, the diminution is due to value received by the
taxpayer, a nondeductible cost of living. Since the loss cannot be apportioned between de-
preciation and market fluctuations, and since the market presumably will reflect the general
cost of living, no attempt is made to permit a deduction when the loss is out of proportion
to value received.
7. Nonbusiness contract losses mitigated by sale on the market, failure to recover
anticipated damages for injury to property and unreimbursed satisfaction of contractual
obligations, guaranties or suretyships are examples of transactions which may resemble
both nondeductible losses and bad debts.
8. 242 F.2d 825 (4th Cir. 1957), reversing 142 F. Supp. 786 (E.D. Va. 1956).
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Taxpayer contracted to sell his house and received partial payment on Decem-
ber 2.9 The balance was to be paid and the title pass on December 30. Taking
possession on December 15, the purchaser refused to remit the balance when
due. 10 Six months later, he surrendered possession, and taxpayer sold the
house for less than contract price and basis.:" Taxpayer was subsequently
awarded a judgment for the difference between contract and market price.12
Since the judgment proved uncollectible, he sought to deduct as a bad debt
that portion which represented the difference between basis and recovery in
mitigation-his unreturned capital.13 Because title had not passed, the court
considered the contract executory and therefore disregarded the default and
judgment ;14 holding the transaction a loss on the sale of a personal residence,
it denied the deduction.',
9. The contract of sale set a purchase price of $17,750, and a down payment of $700
was made. Id. at 826.
10. Ibid. The opinions do not reveal whether this refusal constituted an immediate
total breach, attempted recision or merely failure to tender the purchase money. However,
no immediate duty to mitigate was created in the vendor since the vendee did not surrender
occupancy for six months, see note 11 infra and accompanying text, and the vendor's
damages were measured by contract price less market value at the time of the stipulated
sale six months later, see note 12 infra and accompanying text.
11. 242 F.2d at 826. Taxpayer's basis in the residence was $16,500, the price paid for
the house less than three months earlier. Kyle v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 786 (E.D.
Va. 1956). The vendee surrendered possession June 19, 1947. Taxpayer recovered $13,500
on the market in a stipulated sale, June 27, 1947. 242 F.2d at 826. Whether the house was
actually sold on the market as the state report implies, Henning v. Kyle, 190 Va. 247, 250,
56 S.E.2d 67, 68 (1949), or whether a sale was stipulated for the purpose of measuring
the contract damages as the federal reports suggest, 242 F.2d at 826; Kyle v. United
States, 142 F. Supp. 786 (E.D. Va. 1956), is unclear. The state report indicates that tax-
payer initially brought a price action and amended his complaint to sue for the difference
between contract and market price. In any event, the sale price was $4,250 less than con-
tract price and $3,000 less than taxpayer's basis.
12. Henning v. Kyle, 190 Va. 247, 56 S.E.2d 67 (1949) ; 242 F.2d at 826. Taxpayer
recovered a judgment for $4,415. Henning v. Kyle, 190 Va. 247, 249, 56 S.E.2d 67, 68
(1949). This represented lost profits of $1,250 (contract price of $17,750 less $16,500
basis), $2,300 net loss on the sale in mitigation ($16,500 basis less the $13,500 market
recovery less the $700 deposit) and interest of $865. Brief for Appellants, p. 6, United
States v. Kyle, 242 F.2d 825 (4th Cir. 1957).
13. 242 F.2d at 826. The taxpayer in Kyle claimed the deduction under Int. Rev. Code
of 1939, § 23(k) (4), added by 56 STAT. 821 (1942) ('now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 166(d)).
The federal district court ruled in his favor. Kyle v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 786
(E.D. Va. 1956). See note 18infra.
During the argument before the Fourth Circuit, the parties agreed that the portion of
the judgment representing interest and the difference between basis and contract price
was not deductible. Therefore, the amount in controversy was $2,300 ($3,000 difference
between market value and contract price minus the $700 down payment). 242 F.2d at 826.
Invoking the five-year capital loss carryover provision, Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 117(e)
(1), added by 56 STAT. 844 (1942) (now INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 1212), the taxpayer
claimed a deduction against income for the years 1949-52. 242 F.2d at 826.
14. Id. at 825.
15. Id. at 828. The court distinguished cases cited by taxpayer because "the losses
which were allowed as bad debts did not exceed the adjusted cost bases of the properties
1958]
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The distinction in Kyle between executory and unilaterally performed con-
tracts, while consistent with prior case law, seems an unrealistic ground for
determining deductibility.16 Traditionally, a purchase money mortgagee, who
involved." Id. at 826. However, the taxpayer in Kyle gave up his claim for nonrecovery
of the contract price to the extent that it exceeded basis. The amount he sought to deduct
on appeal was the difference between basis and the amount he recovered on the market
through enforcing his vendor's lien. See note 13 supra; cf. Brief for Appellees, pp. 6-8,
United States v. Kyle, 242 F.2d 825 (4th Cir. 1957).
The opinion dealt with the suggestion that the deduction might be allowed as a loss on
"any transaction entered into for profit, though not connected with a trade or business,"
under § 23(e) of the 1939 Code, 53 STAT. 13 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1 65(c) (2)).
242 F.2d at 825-28. Inasmuch as taxpayer purchased the house less than three months
prior to the profitable contract of sale, accepted a downpayment and permitted the vendee
to occupy, and sustained a loss, he had at least an apparent claim under § 23 (e). The
court held to the contrary on the ground that the property had not been "appropriated to
income producing purposes" within the meaning of U.S. Treas. Reg. 1.11, § 29.23(e)-l
(1943) (now Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-3(b) (1956)). 242 F.2d at 827. But this
regulation contemplates purchase and use of the house as a personal residence, and no in-
dication of this situation was given in Kyle. Moreover, loss on the sale of property acquired
with the predominant purpose of selling at a profit may be deducted even though the tax-
payer used the property as his personal residence. 5 MERTENS § 28.78. Not recognizing
these possibilities, the court's interpretation unnecessarily constricts application of § 165.
Still, the opinion may be justified in that the existence of a distinction between § 165 losses
and § 166 bad debts militates in favor of denying the deduction under § 165 and ruling that
the taxpayer suffered a bad debt. See notes 34-37 infra and accompanying text.
16. Except in instances where the taxpayer has previously accrued and paid a tax on
income to be realized, see, e.g., Leedom & Worrall Co., 10 B.T.A. 825 (1928), no case has
allowed a deduction to a liquidated claim for breach of an executory contract. See Justis,
supra note 1, at 192. See also David E. Thompson, P-H 1944 T.C. Mem. Dec. 1 44175
(dictum distinguishing between an executory contract and a contract of sale). But see
Farmer's Elevator & Exchange, 10 B.T.A. 379 (1928); Bert K. Smith, 5 B.T.A. 480
(1926). However, the reports of these latter cases are inadequate, see 3 PAUL & MERTENS,
FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION § 28.13, at n.45 (1934), and the claims may have been pre-
viously reported as income since they were so written up on the taxpayers' books.
For cases allowing bad debt deductions for claims for breach of executed contracts, see
Charles B. Bohn, 43 B.T.A. 953 (1941); Mary E. Wenger, 42 B.T.A. 225 (1940); James
R. Stewart, 39 B.T.A. 87 (1939); Fort Pitt Bridge Works, P-H 1942 B.T.A. Mem. Dec.
ir 42078; W. Van E. Thompson, 10 B.T.A. 1125 (1928). An executed contract resembles
the simple loan situation. See, e.g., Robert W. DePuy, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 268 (1955);
Meurer Steel Barrel Co., 7 B.T.A. 64 (1927).
Cases denying bad debt deductions to claims for breach of executed contracts turn on
the unliquidated status of the claims. See, e.g., National Contracting Co. v. Commissioner,
105 F.2d 488 (8th Cir. 1939) ; Wadsworth Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 44 F.2d 762 (6th
Cir. 1930) (amount of liability not fixed in year for which a deduction sought). Cornpare
Fort Pitt Bridge Works, supra. Reduction of a claim to judgment is only one means of
liquidating a debt and a return of execution unsatisfied only one method of revealing its
worthlessness. See Norwood Morris Plan Co. v. McCarthy, 295 Mass. 597, 4 N.E.2d 450
(1936) ; 5 MaRTENS §§ 30.28, 30.40.
The courts have been unwilling to allow a deduction for a worthless claim for breach
of contract absent sufficient performance by the taxpayer to furnish a basis for the amount
of the bad debt deduction. Green, supra note 1, at 647; note 3 supra. So in Kyle, the
Fourth Circuit required performance despite liquidation of the claim by judgment, in the
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executes a sale by conveying title, has been allowed a bad debt deduction for
unreturned capital reflected in a worthless mortgage debt.17 The taxpayer in
Kyle is in the same practical position as the mortgagee. 18 Upon default by the
mistaken belief that a deductible debt could not exist without an outlay of cash or property
to the debtor. 242 F.2d at 827.
Authorities quoting the rule that a bad debt deduction will not be allowed for claims
for breach of contract, even when reduced to judgment, rely primarily on Lewvellyn v.
Electric Reduction Co., 275 U.S. 243 (1927), 12 MINN. L. REv. 417 (1928). See, e.g.,
Hanigsberg, supra note 1, at 916-17 nn.8-10; Green, supra note 1, at 648 n.10; Tye, supra
note 1, at 682 n.12. There, the taxpayer paid in advance for merchandise which was never
received. He reduced his claim for refund of the purchase price to judgments in 1919 and
1922 and sought to adjust his 1918 return for the uncollectible debt. The deduction was
disallowed. The Court said that "the buyer's rights were upon a contract for the delivery
of merchandise and were not a 'debt' in either a technical or a colloquial sense." Lewellyn
v. Electric Reduction Co., supra at 246. However, since the judgment postdated the year
for which deduction was claimed, since the debt was in no way liquidated in that year,
and since taxpayer apparently did not abandon his rights on the contract in that year,
Lewellyn does not preclude holding uncollectible liquidated claims for breach of executory
contracts deductible as bad debts. See 3 PAUL & MERTENs, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION
§ 28.13 (1934) ; 3 RIA, FED. TAX COORDiNATOR § M-1,101, at n.19; Justis, supra note 1. In-
stead, it merely holds that a contested claim is not a debt. See Birdsboro Steel Foundry
& Machine Co. v. United States, 78 Ct. Cl. 100, 3 F. Supp. 640 (1933).
17. See, e.g., Harold S. Denniston, 37 B.T.A. 834 (1938) (bad debt deduction allowed
for difference--constituting unreturned capital-between purchase money mortgage debt
released and HOLC bonds received) ; Doris D. Havemeyer, 45 B.T.A. 329 (1941). And
see Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.166-3 (1956) :
"(a) If mortgaged or pledged property is lawfully sold (whether to the creditor or an-
other purchaser) for less than the amount of the debt, and the portion of the indebtedness
remaining unsatisfied after such sale is wholly or partially uncollectible, the mortgagee
or pledgee may deduct such amount (to the extent that it constitutes capital or represents
an item the income from which has been returned by him) as a bad debt for the taxable
year...."
If a mortgagee purchases the property at the foreclosure sale for more than market
value, he is allowed a bad debt deduction for the difference between the amount of the
debtor's obligations applied to the purchase or bid price of the property and the full value
of the debt ("to the extent that it constitutes capital or represents an item the income from
which has been returned by him"), and a capital loss deduction for the difference between
the amount paid and fair market value. If he purchases for less than the fair market value,
he realizes capital gain in addition to the bad debt deduction. However, absent clear proof
to the contrary, the amount bid by the taxpayer is presumed to equal fair market value.
In this event, the mortgagee, of course, has only the bad debt deduction. Proposed U.S.
Treas. Reg. § 1.166-3 (1956).
Whatever economic gain the mortgagee realizes from purchasing for less than market
value is subject to the mortgagor's ability to recoup the property at the deflated bid price
in states where a redemption period is applicable. Green, supra note 1, at 653.
18. See OSBORNE, MORTGAGES §§ 20, 95, 213, at 554-55 & n.15 (1951) (hereinafter cited
as OsprOrE) ; 1 GLENN, MORTGAGES §§ 15, 15.1 (1943) (hereinafter cited as GLENN). See
also Lewis v. Hawkins, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 119 (1874) ; James R. Stewart, 39 B.T.A. 87,
90 (1939). Taxpayer's judgment for breach of contract in Kyle-measured by the differ-
ence between contract and market price--is comparable to a mortgagee's deficiency judg-
ment measured by the difference between contract price and either foreclosure sale price
1958]
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buyer, the mortgagee must sue to eject, foreclose and obtain a deficiency judg-
ment to regain his presale position.19 Similarly, the seller who has surrendered
possession but not title must sue in ejectment and for damages to avoid loss on
his bargain. 20 In many states, moreover, the mortgagee has certain rights as
record holder, and in so far as he possesses title, his legal position parallels that
or "fair value." Cf. OSBORNE §§ 333, 335. The district court had analogized the judgment
representing the unpaid balance of the purchase price to a note or other form of security
and pointed out that uncollectible notes given for the purchase price in the sale of realty
are deductible when worthless. Kyle v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 786-87 (E.D. Va.
1956); see W. Van E. Thompson, 10 B.T.A. 1125 (1928). See also Charles B. Bohn, 43
B.T.A. 953 (1941) ; Mary E. Wenger, 42 B.T.A. 225, 232-33 (1940) ; James R. Stewart,
supra. While the circuit court admitted that the purchaser had acquired an "equitable in-
terest" in the property, it regarded nonpassage of title as determinative for tax purposes.
See 242 F.2d at 825, 827. But title is pragmatically irrelevant to the nonrevenue rights
and remedies of the parties. See WALSH, EQUITY § 59 (1930) (hereinafter cited as
WALSH). For the extent of the similarities, see notes 20-21, infra and accompanying text.
Cf. also Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1 (a) (2) (1956) (formerly U.S. Treas. Reg.
111, § 29.23(e)-i (1943)) ("substance and not mere form will govern in determining
deductible losses").
Unlike a cash basis taxpayer, an accrual basis seller is taxed on the gain realized by
a contract of sale when the purchaser becomes unconditionally obligated to pay for the
property. This liability may occur before delivery of the deed, and hence title, if the buyer
takes possession under a contract which requires the taxpayer to deliver a deed upon pay-
ment of the consideration as in Kyle. See Lucas v. North Texas Lumber Co., 281 U.S. 11
(1930); N. J. Arnold, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 280 (1953).
19. The most prevalent means of foreclosure of land mortgages is judicial sale, which
requires a suit initiated by the mortgagee. See OSBORNE §§ 10, 317-36; 1 GLENN § 77. An
action at law on the obligation and execution on the security also necessitates suit by
the mortgagee. See OSBORNE §§ 314-16; 1 GLENN § 71. Although the vendor may seek to
avoid the need for judicial aid in foreclosure by including a power of sale in the security
instrument, see OSBORNE §§ 10, 337-45, or by attempting to exercise statutory self-help,
see OSBORNE §§ 314-16; 1 GLENN § 71, or strict foreclosure, see OSBORNE §§ 311-13;
1 GLENN §§ 59.1, 61, 67, judicial supervision is accessible to the mortgagor by a bill to
redeem or for an accounting, see OSBORNE § 303; 1 GLENN § 37.1. And to obtain a defi-
ciency decree, the creditor must bring suit against the debtor. See OSBORNE § 333; 1 GLENN
§§ 77.2, 101.
20. Both a vendor who has retained title and a mortgagee must eject an unco-opera-
tive defaulting debtor to regain possession or sell. See 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1412
(3d ed. 1939). A vendor will then sue for damages to be made whole. See WALSH § 91. Or,
he may sue in equity to enforce his vendor's lien. See Annot., 91 A.L.R. 148, 151 (1934) ;
WALSH § 86. See, generally, OSBORNE §§ 19, 20; 1 GLENN §§ 14-15.1. Or he may sue to
foreclose the vendee's equity. See 1 GLENN §§ 15, 67.1; WALSH § 91. The vendor's remedies
against a defaulting vendee will be determined by the underlying nature of the transaction
rather than by its form. See, generally, OSBORNE § 20; WALSH § 91; 1 GLENN § 67.1.
Therefore, retention of title by the vendor may be as insignificant to his rights against the
defaulting vendee as the title or lien theory of mortgages is to the remedies of a mortgagee.
See Sturges & Clark, Legal Theory and Real Property Mortgages, 37 YALE L.J. 691
(1.928); note 21 infra.
Vendors may be induced to prefer the contract of sale by the possibility that it will be
governed by freedom of contract doctrines rather than the traditional equitable principles
applicable to mortgages. See OSBORNE § 20. However, although the measure of damages
in the action at law (contract minus market) theoretically is equivalent to the deficiency
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of the taxpayer in Kyle.2 1 Denying a bad debt deduction to one but not the
other not only overlooks the equivalence of their performance and loss, it limits
the seller's commercial alternatives. Unlike a mortgagee, the contract seller
may avoid equity or right of redemption.2 2 Gearing a bad debt deduction for
capital loss occasioned by the buyer's default to the passage or retention of title
could force the seller to structure his transaction in a manner otherwise im-
provident.
The rationale underlying Kyle's denial of a bad debt deduction to an unsatis-
fied judgment creditor would further prejudice such a creditor if he subse-
quently recovered on the judgment. By treating the contract, default, sale on
the market and uncollectible judgment as a single transaction on which a non-
deductible loss was sustained,23 the court effectively prevented any subsequent
recovery from qualifying as a return of capital. With the judgment deemed
irrelevant to the tax consequences of the final sale, collection on the judgment
could hardly be attributed to that sale. Since recovery would not be otherwise
excludable, it would constitute ordinary income despite its fundamental char-
acter as a return of capital and gain on the sale of a capital asset.24 Again, un-
decree--downpayments and mortgage payments assumed equal-the jury at law constitutes
an unpredictable variable in this determination. See, generally, GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY
c. 15 (1930) ; STAL.TASMR, WHAT PRcE JuRY TRIALS? (1931) ; ELDER, "REsoLVED THAT
JURY TRIALS IIN CVn. CASES SHOULD BE ABoLIsHED" (Yale Law Library Pam. No. 5)
(Debate over Radio WOR, New York City, Dec. 21, 1930).
21. See 1 GLENN §§ 30, 36; OSBORNE §§ 129, 133; TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 873
(abr. ed. 1940). The rights of the mortgagee as against the mortgagor supposedly depend
upon whether the given jurisdiction adheres to a "title," "intermediate" or "lien" theory
of mortgages. See OSBORNE §§ 14, 15, 160, 302. However, the validity of a rigid theoretical
or practical distinction between these theories is questionable. See OSBORNE § 16; Sturges
& Clark, supra note 20; McDougal, Book Review, 44 YALE L.J. 1278 (1935).
22. OSBORNE § 20. However, a seller surrendering possession while retaining title as
security for the purchase money runs the risk of treatment as a mortgagee. See 1 GLENN
§ 15.1. Nevertheless, a preliminary' sale contract, as distinguished from a long-term in-
stallment agreement, will give a vendor greater rights than a mortgagee, against both a
vendee on default and third parties. See 1 GLENN § 15; OSBORNE § 20. The agreement in
Kyle, calling for complete payment of the purchase price in two weeks, was clearly a pre-
liminary sale contract.
In some jurisdictions, a long-term contract vendor is allowed a right analogous to strict
foreclosure. By so providing in the contract, he may escape a right to redeem in the
vendee, keep the installments paid and sue for the installments due or damages. OSBORNE
§ 20. And, a vendor may structure a transaction to avoid the label "mortgage" and thus
preclude risk of subordination to subsequent takers protected under recording acts. See
Keefe v. Cropper, 196 Iowa 1179, 194 N.W. 305 (1923) ; OSBORNE § 213.
23. 242 F.2d at 827.
24. Recovery on a judgment constitutes income unless it is a return of capital or ex-
cludable under § 104(a) (2) or § 111. Cf. IxT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a) ; 2 MERTENS
§ 12.40; Plumb, Incone Tax on Gains and Losses in Litigation, 25 CORNELL L.Q. 221
(1940). Subsequent recovery of the Kyle debt could not consistently be treated as a return
of capital, since the recovery in mitigation was postulated as the entire proceeds of a final
sale upon which a nondeductible loss was computed. 242 F.2d at 827. INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, §§ 104 (tort claims), 111 (tax benefit rule), are inapplicable. However, the tax-
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like normal gain on the sale of a residence, that part of the judgment repre-
senting profit could not be applied to the basis of a new residence purchased
by the taxpayer within one year. The Code permits such application only when
the gain is derived from the sale of an old residence, 25 and the reasoning that
the judgment cannot constitute proceeds of the sale precludes satisfaction of
this requirement.
The inequity of the refusal to allow a bad debt deduction in Kyle is demon-
strated by extension of the court's reasoning to an accrual basis taxpayer who
pays a tax on gain from the sale of a residence and fails to receive the gain.2
Normally, payment of a tax on income accrued but never received entitles a
taxpayer to a deduction from current taxable income.27 Kyle denied a deduc-
tion when the taxpayer failed to realize a return of previously taxed capital.2 8
Previously taxed capital is merely previously taxed income put to a capital
use.2 9 Therefore, Kyle suggests that a deduction designed to compensate for
failure to receive previously taxed income should also be denied. Further, if
the accrual basis taxpayer were to sell his residence in mitigation, reduce his
claim to judgment and recover, Kyle would dictate ordinary income taxation
of the recovery. A tax equal to the difference between the capital gains tax
paid and the income tax owing would be imposed even though the recovery
over basis would in fact be capital gain.3 0
payer sought to deduct only the difference between his basis and the judgment and pro-
ceeds of the sale in mitigation, the extent to which he had failed to receive a return of
capital. See notes 13, 15 supra. Furthermore, recovery constituting profit could not qualify
as capital gain under the Kyle court's reasoning. Now, recovery of damages for breach of
contract representing income which would have been received in prior taxable years is taxed
at no greater rate than if received and taxed during those years under a new "spread-
back" provision. IET. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1305 (a).
25. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1034(a), provides that gain on the sale of an "old (prin-
cipal) residence" shall be recognized only to the extent that the taxpayer's adjusted sales
price of the old residence exceeds his cost of purchasing a "new (principal) residence."
Section 1034(e) dictates a commensurate reduction in the taxpayer's basis in the new
residence.
26. See note 18 supra. See also Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U.S.
182 (1934) (accrual basis taxpayer required to report as income entire debt determined
to be partially worthless in the taxable year, because he had right to receive the income
during that year).
27. See Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.166-2 (1956) (allowing deduction for non-
recovery of income items previously accrued) ; Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner,
supra note 26 (dictum allowing such a deduction). Because a variation in taxpayer's
taxable income from year to year may result in different rates of taxation, a credit for
overpayment would provide more accurate reimbursement than a deduction from current
income. Cf. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1341, allowing a taxpayer who restores income pre-
viously reported under an apparent claim of right either a deduction or a credit for tax
paid, whichever is of greater benefit to him.
28. See note 24 supra.
29. -See note 2 supra and accompanying text. Cf. French v. Wolf, 181 La. 733, 160
So. 396 (1935).
30. See IxT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6211. If an accrual basis taxpayer is not required
to pay the difference between capital gains tax .paid and ordinary income tax assessable,
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In addition to fostering inequitable tax treatment, rigid limitation of bad debt
deductions to losses arising from unilaterally performed contracts frustrates the
policy inherent in section 166.31 The deduction compensates for taxes paid on
capital lost to the taxpayer through another's promissory default.3 2 The re-
quirement of promissory default insures nondeductibility of nonbusiness capital
losses attributable to market fluctuations alone.33 Since it was realized on the
market, the loss in Kyle may appear beyond the scope of section 166.' 4 How-
ever, the dominant cause of the loss was the promisor's breach. By inducing
reliance on the contract, he became liable upon default for damages reflecting
a drop in the market.30 Taxpayer's award of damages demonstrates that the
source of the loss was the promisor's breach and not solely market fluctuation.
For once a seller need no longer honor his contract, he will be required to sell
to protect the promisor. Any judgment awarded but not recovered will be
limited by the extent to which the seller's failure to mitigate prejudices the
he will be in a better tax position than a cash basis taxpayer, since Kyle would require
the latter to pay ordinary income tax on recovery over basis. But paying income tax is
unjust in either case, for each only manifests a realization of capital gain. See note 12
supra; note 24 supra and accompanying text.
31. One commentator who would so limit the deduction relies on alimony cases. 5
MERTENs § 30.06. But these cases do not manifest any failure to receive a return of capital.
See note 3 supra.
32. See notes 1, 2 supra and accompanying text.
33. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
34. An oversimplified view of the facts is misleading. Taxpayer owned a house worth
$16,500 and sold it for $13,500, thus sustaining a loss apparently caused by a drop in the
market. Had taxpayer never regained possession of the house (for example, if it had been
destroyed while in the vendee's possession) or had he kept it as his residence, the basic
cause of the loss would have been evident. In either event, the contract vendee's obligation
would not be submerged in a loss sustained and seemingly caused by a market drop. In-
stead, the judgment, representing the vendee's responsibility for the vendor's injury, would
stand alone, nonrecovery exhibiting a bad debt loss.
If a taxpayer recovers neither possession of the house nor a complete return of capital,
he should be allowed a bad debt deduction up to basis. The vendee would then be entitled
to a casualty loss deduction if sudden accidental destruction were the reason for nonreturn.
hoT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 165(c) (3). If the taxpayer kept the house after regaining
possession, he should be allowed to deduct nonrecovery up to basis as a bad debt but be
required to make a commensurate reduction in basis for future tax purposes. If the house
is lost by casualty after the taxpayer recovers possession, a casualty loss deduction up to
market value and a bad debt deduction for the difference between market value and basis
should be allowed.
35. 5 Conimx §§ 992, 1100, 1145, at 648, 652; 3 CoRBIN §§ 662, 666. The promisor
is made to assume the risk of the market. See Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest
in Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 55, 74-75 (1936) (expectation and reliance in-
terests in contract damages may coalesce). The discussion in text assumes that the con-
tract price was equal to fair market value when the contract was signed. If the contract
price exceeded fair market value, the taxpayer's loss upon default might be attributed to
prior market conditions. But contract law would still grant the vendor a judgment for the
difference between contract and market price. 5 CoRBIN §§ 992, 1002; RESTATFMENT,
CONTRACrs § 329 (1932). And recovery on the judgment would still constitute a return of
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buyer.36 Thus, although a taxpayer has not performed, if the market falls before
the promisor's breach has created a duty to mitigate damages, any loss is neces-
sarily caused by the promisor's breach and should, in so far as it represents
unreturned capital, qualify as a bad debt.37 Occasioned by promissory default
rather than market fluctuation, the loss manifests the very characteristics sec-
tion 166 was designed to reach.
Permitting bad debt deductions for capital lost through breach of executory
contracts will not increase tax avoidance opportunities. Admittedly, a taxpayer
who must himself perform in order to acquire a bad debt deduction cannot
structure a transaction to gain the deduction without incurring a concomitant
loss.38 But since the debt must have a basis and be both valuable when acquired
and subsequently proved worthless,3 9 evasion is also unlikely in the case of
executory contracts. A taxpayer could not, for example, contract to sell his
residence to a bankrupt accomplice, retain title and possession and later obtain
a deduction; the debt would be worthless when acquired.40 Nor could he gain
an undeserved deduction by selling to a solvent associate. Unless the promisor
became insolvent, the debt could not be proved worthless. 41 Thus unsupported
capital up to basis just as if the contract had been performed according to its terms. Cf.
5 CoRBiN §§ 996, at 14 (comparing restitution and damages), 1145 (price action and speci-
fic performance), 1221, 1222, 1224 (damages, restitution and specific performance). Con-
sequently, failure to collect on the judgment should entitle the injured vendor to a bad debt
deduction since he was unable to obtain a return of capital because of another's promissory
default.
If the contract price were less than the taxpayer's basis in the property, the vendor
would clearly be entitled to a bad debt deduction for nonrecovery up to contract price, and
no more. Similarly, if the taxpayer contracted for less than fair market value, the judg-
ment would again limit the bad debt deduction to the contract price. In neither case would
the taxpayer be able to take a deduction beyond his basis.
36. RESTATEMENT, CoNTRAc s § 336 (1932); 5 CoRBiN § 1039.
37. See note 35 supra.
38. See 5 MEaarxs § 30.12.
39. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 166(b) ; note 1 supra.
40. In the case of a wholly executory contract, the debt may not appear to arise until
the time of breach, when the injured party can obtain money damages. See 5 CoRBIN § 995,
at 11; cf. Comment, 65 YALE L.J. 992 (1956); note 1 supra. And in many instances, a
promisor is insolvent at the time of breach. Thus, the requirement that a debt have value
when acquired, see note 1 supra, might seem to prevent a taxpayer injured by an insolvent's
breach of an executory contract from obtaining a bad debt deduction. But when a court
decrees compensatory money damages, it enforces a secondary obligation on the part of the
promisor to save the promisee harmless in case of default. See 5 CoRn § 995; RESTATE-
,MENT, CoNmtAcrs § 329 (1932). This obligation had value when acquired by the taxpayer
upon contracting and became worthless upon the promisor's insolvency. Therefore, a de-
duction should be allowed for its worthlessness up to the taxpayer's basis.
Application of this rationale would continue to prevent deductibility of gifts disguised
as loans, tax benefit from the voluntary acquisition of another's worthless debts or tax
benefit from loans made without reasonable hope of repayment. See, generally, 5 MERTzNs
§ 30.11.
41. So long as the debt had value when acquired, awareness of a potential deduction
for uncollectibility is not an element of a tax fraud. Moreover, a bad debt deduction re-
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by tax avoidance considerations, the case law restriction of section 166 to uni-
laterally performed contracts should be rejected in favor of a rule allowing bad
debt deductions for all transactions which in fact encompass a failure, occa-
sioned by promisory default, to realize a return of previously taxed capital.
quires a proportionate decrease in basis as the necessary result of the return of capital
implied for tax purposes. See Ixr. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1012, 1016; Ludlow Valve Mfg.
Co. v. Durey, 57 F.2d 583 (N.D.N.Y. 1931), aff'd, 62 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1933). Accordingly,
a taxpayer cannot gain a tax deduction and a subsequent tax-free return of capital by sell-
ing to a solvent buyer whom he expects to default.
